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STATUTE
TAX EXEMP110NS FOR RACIALLY
DISCRIMINATORY PRIVATE SCHOOLS: A
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
NEAL DEVINS*
In Revenue Ruling 71-447, the Internal Revenue Service expressly denied
tax exemptions to racially discriminatory private schools. The Reagan
administration recently challenged the existence of a defined policy prohibiting tax exemptions to these schools as well as the propriety of the
IRS's involvement in regulating social policy. President Reagan has called
upon Congress to settle the issue by enacting affirmative legislation. Congress, however, has maintained that long-established federal policy supports Revenue Ruling 71-447 and has refused to enact affirmative legislation.
In this Article, Mr. Devins examines the conflict between the executive,
judicial, and legislative branches of government and argues that Congress
must rationalize the present system by incorporating federal antidiscrimination policy and judicially defined constitutional guarantees into a
coherent statute.

On January 8, 1982, the United States Treasury Department
announced that "without further guidance from Congress, the
Internal Revenue Service will no longer revoke or deny taxexempt status for religious, charitable, educational, or scientific
organizations on the grounds that they don't conform with fundamental public policies. " 1 This policy shift by the Reagan administration reversed the established position of the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) that tax exemptions should be withheld
from racially discriminatory private schools. 2 The administration argued that Congress should provide the IRS with explicit

* Research Associate, Institute for Public Policy Studies, Vanderbilt University;
B.A., Georgetown University, 1978; J.D., Vanderbilt Law School, 1982.
The author would like to thank Jeffrey Schoenblum, Chester E. Finn, Jr., and Madison
Towers for reading an initial draft of this Article; and Donald Hall, Joseph Harrison,
and Robert Morgan for their editorial suggestions.
1 I.R.S. News Release (Jan. 8, 1982); 2 CCH Tax Exempt Organizations ~ 6578, at
9127.
2 Congress had previously considered enacting legislation on this matter in the summer
of 1979. See, e.g., S. 103, S. 449, S. 990, S. 995, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CoNG. REc.
16,432-44 (1979). See generally Tax-Exempt Status ofPrivate Schools: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Management of the Senate Comm. on Finance,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
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statutory guidance concerning the implementation of a nondiscrimination requirement and the denial of tax-exempt status to
discriminatory schools. 3
Thus far, Congress has refused the invitation to enact such
new legislation, as it believes that a nondiscrimination requirement already is contained in existing statutes and court rulings. 4
Courts have been similarly hesitant about the administration's
position. In Wright v. Regan,5 the District Court of the District
of Columbia questioned the legitimacy of the Presidenfs action
by issuing an injunction prohibiting the IRS from granting tax
exemptions to racially discriminatory schools. 6 The present law
reflects the absence of a coherent policy amoqg the three
branches of government.
Because the survival of many private schools depends on their
tax-exempt status, any congressional action would have widespread effects. 7 Such legislative action also would reveal how
the federal government perceives its role in regulating discriminatory private schools. 8
This Article proposes that Congress should enact specific
legislation dealing with the problem of racial bias in private
education. Such legislation would reduce the current confusion
over the existence of a racial nondiscrimination requirement. It
also would resolve conflicts in the implementation of this nondiscrimination policy among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Under the legislation proposed by this Article,
3 See Speech by President Ronald Reagan to Cabinet (Jan. 18, 1982); see also Letter
from President Ronald Reagan to Vice President George Bush (Jan. 18, 1982), reprinted
in 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 37 (Jan. 25, 1982).
4
128 CoNG. REc. SI08 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Hart); 128 CoNa.
Rec. Sill (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Bradley); cf. infra notes 59-67 and
accompanying text.
5
656 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981), petition for cert.filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3467 (U.S. Nov,
23, 1981) (No. 81-97).
6
The injunction is effective until the final resolution of the case. Wright v. Regan,
No. 80-1124 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 18, 1982) (order granting injunction).
7
Congressional action or inaction will have a significant impact on private education
generally. See infra notes 90-102 and accompanying text.
8 The media have focused closely on the recent case of Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 468 F. Supp. 890 (D.S.C. 1978), rev'd, 639 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. granted,
102 S. Ct. 386 (1981) as indicative of the federal government's attitude in this area. See,
e.g., U.S. Shifts on School Exemption, Wash. Post, Jan. 13, 1982, at 1, col. 4.; Race
Bias Won't Bar Tax-Exempt Status for Private, Religious Schools, U.S. Says, Wall St.
J., Jan. 11, 1982, at 1, col. 1; U.S. Drops Rule on Tax Penalty for Racial Bias, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 9, 1982, at AI, col. 2.
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the courts would apply and the IRS would implement the general
nondiscrimination requirement enacted by Congress.
I. OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENTAL ACTIONS BEFORE
THE REAGAN POLICY SHIFT

A. The Judicial Basis of Nondiscrimination Policy
The national policy opposing racially discriminatory school
systems stems from the Supreme Court's landmark decision in
Brown v. Board of Education. 9 Segregated private educational
institutions, sometimes with the aid of state subsidies, long have
been used to circumvent Brown in particular, and the goals of
racial equality and of equal educational opportunity in general. 10
"The estimated enrollment in southern private schools organized
or expanded in response to desegregation increased from
roughly 25,000 in 1966 to approximately 535,000 by 1972." 11 As
one court observed, "[U]nless this [private segregated school]
system is destroyed, it will shatter to bits the public school
system . . . and kill the hope that now exists for equal educational opportunities for all our citizens, white and black. " 12
Yet before 1970, the federal government generally prohibited
only direct federal assistance to discriminatory private schools. 13
One exception to this policy was a 1967 IRS ruling that a tax
"exemption will be denied and contributions will not be deductible if the operation of the school is on a segregated basis
and its involvement with the state or political subdivision is
such as to make the operation unconstitutional or a violation of
9 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (racial segregation in public schools a denial of due process
under the Fifth Amendment).
10 See, e.g., J. ELY, THE CRISIS OF CONSERVATIVE VIRGINIA (1976) (private education
subsidies used to promote massive resistance to desegregation). Similar action was
taken in North Carolina, Mississippi, and Louisiana. See D. NEVIN & R. BILLS, THE
SCHOOLS THAT FEAR .BUILT (1976); King, Rebuilding the Fallen House--State Tuition
Grants for Elementary and Secondary Education, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1971).
11 Comment, Segregation Academies and State Action, 82 YALE L.J. 1436, 1441
(1973).
12 Poindexter v. Louisiana Fin. Assistance Comm'n, 275 F . Supp. 833, 857-58 (E.D.
La. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 389 U.S. 571 (1968).
13 Direct assistance was prohibited under § 602 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U .S.C. § 2000d-1.
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the laws of the United States. " 14 This nondiscriminatory policy
was of limited value, however, because a constitutional violation
by the state was difficult to prove. 15
In July 1970, the IRS altered this policy 16 after an injunction,
made permanent in Green v. Connally, that denied tax exemptions to discriminatory schools in Mississippi. 17 The IRS based
this decision on a finding that it would be improper to grant tax
exemptions to schools that violate the important public policy
objectives established in Brown and in the Civil Rights Act of
1964. 18 This is a specific application of the "frustration of public
policy" doctrine, whereby the government is prohibited from
benefiting individuals, institutions, or organizations whose practices or beliefs are contrary to national policy objectives. 19 The
Green court mandated that schools seeking tax-exempt status
adopt a policy of racial nondiscrimination, publish that policy,
and provide certain information to enable the IRS to determine
that the schools did not racially discriminate. 20 Although the
decision was limited to Mississippi,21 the court stated that the
IRS "would be within its authority in including similar requirements for all schools of the nation. " 22
14

I.R.S. News Release (Aug. 2, 1967); N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1967, at A24, col. 3. An
example of impermissible state support would be a discriminatory private school that
had contracted with the Army to teach the children of Army personnel.
15
See Brown, State Action Analysis ofTax Expenditures, 91 HARV. L. REV. 97 (1976)
(nexus to state action difficult to establish). Recent Supreme Court decisions also suggest
the difficulty of establishing state action. See, e.g., Rendeii-Baker v. Kohn, 102 S. Ct.
2764 (1982); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
16
See I.R.S. News Release (July 10, 1970); N.Y. Times, July II, 1970, at AI, col.

8.
17
Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Coit v. Green,
404 U.S. 997 (1971). A permanent injunction was issued in Green v. Connally, 330
F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd summarily, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). The precedential effect
of this affirmance is unclear. In Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, the Supreme Court gave it
little precedential weight. See 416 U.S. 725, 740 n.ll (1974) ("[T]he court's affirmance
in Green lacks that precedential weight of a case involving a truly adversary controversy."). But see Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 463 n.6 (1973) (citing Green with
approval). Congress recognized Green's possible precedential value when it amended
the tax-exemption provision of the Internal Revenue Code to prohibit the granting of
tax exemptions to racially discriminatory private clubs. See infra notes 67-71 and
accompanying text.
18 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-2000h4 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
19
See Tank Truck Rentals v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1958).
20 330 F. Supp. at 1179--80.
21
Id. at 1176. The order was limited because the injured party in that case was from
Mississippi and was seeking relief only in that state.
22

Id.
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The IRS adopted this recommendation in 1971 by issuing
Revenue Ruling 71-447, which prohibited the granting of tax
exemptions to private schools that maintained racially discriminatory policies. 23 Private schools seeking tax-exempt status
were required to publicize their nondiscriminatory policies. 24
The IRS issued Revenue Procedure 72-54 to provide guidelines
for publishing these policies,25 although no particular method of
publication was required. 26
In 1975, the IRS updated its requirements for private schools
seeking tax-exempt status. Revenue Procedure 75-5027 set forth
guidelines and mandated record-keeping to determine if a private school's policies were racially nondiscriminatory. A school
was required to "show affirmatively both that it has adopted a
racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students that is made
known to the general public and that since the adoption of that
policy it has operated in a bona fide manner in accordance
therewith." 28 The regulation required tax-exempt institutions:
(a) to adopt formally nondiscriminatory policies in their charters
or bylaws, (b) to refer to such policies in their advertising brochures, and (c) to publish annual notice of such policies in a
local newspaper of general circulation. 29
Recognizing that religious schools appeal to a discrete segment of the community, the Procedure allowed these schools to
satisfy their publication requirement through a notice of nondiscrimination in a newsletter or magazine of the religious organization.30 In 1975, the IRS also published a revenue ruling denying tax-exempt status to any religious institution that maintained
racially discriminatory policies, even if that discrimination were
based on sincere religious beliefs. 31 Current IRS policies are
based on these two 1975 rulings.

23

Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230.
Rev. Proc. 72-54, 1972-2 C.B. 834.
25
Id.
26 Id. § 3.01, 1972-2 C.B. 834. For example, "publication by a school of notice of its
racially nondiscriminatory policy in a newspaper of general circulation serving all racial
segments of the locality from which the school's student body is drawn." I d.
27
Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587.
28 Id. § 2.02, 1975-2 C.B. 587.
29
/d. § 2.02, 1975-2 C.B. 587.
30 Id. § 4.03, 1975-2 C.B. 588.
24
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B. The Proposed 1978 Regulations
In July 1976, two lawsuits were brought that questioned the
adequacy of the 1975 enforcement procedures. First, in Green
v. Miller3 2 the plaintiff sought enforcement of the permanent
injunction issued in Green v. Connally. Second, a nationwide
class action, Wright v. Regan,33 was brought to implement more
stringent enforceme11t procedures throughout the country.
These lawsuits, in addition to a concern that some private
schools adjudicated discriminatory by a court or by an administrative body were deemed nondiscriminatory under the 1975
guidelines,34 prompted the IRS to review and ultimately to revise
its procedures.
On August 21, 1978, the IRS published a new proposed Revenue Procedure.35 Under this Procedure, a private school was
considered discriminatory either if it had been held by a court
or an agency to be racially discriminatory or if it had an insignificant number of minority students and was formed or was
substantially expanded at or about the time that the public
schools in the community were desegregated. 36
These standards were in many respects similar to the constitutional standards approved by the Supreme Court in Norwood
v. Harrison. 31 Under the Norwood standards, a private school
31 Rev. Rul. 75-231, 1975-1 C.B. 158. The IRS based this position on the Supreme
Court's recognition "that a religious basis for an activity will not serve to preclude
governmental interference with the activity if it is otherwise clearly contrary to federal
public policy." Id. at 159; see Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). The IRS
position was upheld by the Fourth Circuit in Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639
F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980) (rev'g 468 F. Supp. 890 (D.S.C. 1978)), cert. gramed, 454 U.S.
892 (1981), and in Goldsboro Christian Schools v. United States, 644 F.2d 879 (4th Cir.
1981) (aff'g 436 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D.N.C. 1977)), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 892 (1981).
The Bob Jones University and Goldsboro Schools cases recently were argued before
the Supreme Court. 51 U.S.L.W. 3295 (U.S. Oct. 19, 1982).
32 Motion to Enforce Decree and for further Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 7,
Green v. Miller, 45 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H)~ 1566 (D. Colo. 1980).
33 480 F. Supp. 790 (D.D.C. 1979).
34
See Tax-Exempt Status of Private Schools: Hearings Before the Subcomm. 011
Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1979)
(testimony of Jerome Kurtz, Comm'r, IRS) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
3s 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296 (1978).
36 Id. at 37,296-97.
37
413 U.S. 455 (1973). The Court declared unconstitutional a Mississippi textbook
lending program that provided textbooks to all private schools, including those that
excluded students on the basis of race. Plaintiffs had alleged that the law was unconstitutional on two grounds. First, the program was viewed as direct state aid to racially
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may obtain certification of nondiscrimination by providing information as to its admissions policies and the number of its
minoiity students. Unlike this informational requirement, however, the proposed IRS procedure used percentages to define
what constituted an insignificant minority enrollment. 38 This
would have established radal quotas for suspect schools. The
Procedure also did not distinguish: between religious and nonreligious schools, even "if religious schools granted preference
in admission to students ef their faith. 39
The IRS received an enormous number of written comments,
mostly hostile, concerning this Procedure. 40 This firestorm of
protest led to the scheduling of oversight hearings in both
Houses of Congress. 41 On Feburary 9, 1979, a few days before
these hearings were to begin, the IRS introduced a milder version of the proposed regulations. 42 Unlike the IRS's earlier proposal, the revised Procedure permitted the IRS to consider special circumstances in granting tax-exempt status, such as the
formation or expansion of religious schools whose denominational beliefs did not mandate racial discrimination. 43 The new
regulations, however, retained a modified version of the numerical "significant minority enrollment" test. 44 Public opposition
to this quota-like standard and congressional fears regarding
possible IRS control over private education resulted in severe
criticism of the revised proposal.45
segregated education. Second, the program was considered to impede the desegregation
of public educational facilities. The Court based its decision on the first ground.
38 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296, 37,298 (1978). Suspect schools having a student body whose
percentage of minority students was less than 20% of the percentage of the minority
school age population in the community served by the school would have lost their taxexempt status unless they could show good-faith efforts to attract available minority
students. Good faith was defined as satisfaction of four of the following five criteria: (1)
availability and granting of significant minority scholarships, (2) vigorous minority recruitment, (3) an increased percentage of minority enrollment, (4) employment of minority teachers or professional staff, and (5) other substantial evidence.
n See id. at 37,297-98.
40 See Wilson, An Overview of the I.R.S.'s Revised Proposed Revenue Procedure on
Private Schools as Tax-Exempt Organizations, 57 TAXES 515 (1979).
41 See id.
42
44 Fed. Reg. 9451 (1979).
43
!d. at 9453.
"'!d. (exceptions from this standard granted when "circumstances ... limit the
school's ability to attract minority students").
45 See Hearings, supra note 34, at 280-304 (testimony of William B. Ball, counsel for
Nat'! Comm. for Religious Freedom); id. at 725-29 (testimony of Sen. Hatch); id. at
971-83 (testimony of Rep. Robert Dornan).
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C. Congressional Response to the 1978 Proposal
Congress, satisfied with existing procedures and alarmed by
the IRS's revised guidelines, stayed the implementation of these
guidelines by passing riders to the Treasury Appropriations Act
of 1980.46 The Doman Amendment provided that "none of the
funds available under [the] Act may be used to carry out [the
IRS proposals]."47 The Ashbrook Amendment provided more
generally that no funds may be used "to formulate or carry out
any rule, policy, procedure, guideline, standard or measure
which would cause the loss of tax exempt status to private,
religious, or church-operated schools ... unless in effect prior
to August 22, 1978."48 These restrictions, which were scheduled
to lapse on October 1, 1980, have remained in force through
continuing resolutions passed by Congress. 49
Congress has been satisfied to maintain the status quo through
these riders; affirmative legislation modifying the tax-exemption
provision of the Internal Revenue Code has been thought unnecessary. The House recently revised the Ashbrook Amendment to extend its coverage, thereby precluding the IRS from
implementing judicial statutory interpretations that require more
stringent nondiscrimination enforcement measures than the
standards in effect before August 22, 1978. 50 This modification
resulted from congressional dissatisfaction with the court's holding in Green v. Miller. 51 The Miller court used a test similar to
that in Norwood, in holding that a school was presumed to be
46 Dornan Amendment, Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appro·
priations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-74, § 615, 93 Stat. 559,571 (1979); Ashbrook Amendment,
Pub. L. No. 96-74, § 103, 93 Stat. 559, 562 (1979); see also 125 CONG. REC. Sl1 ,97985 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1979) (Senate debate); 125 CoNG. REc. Sll,829-54 (daily ed. Sept.
5, 1979) (same); 125 CoNG. REc. H5979-85 (daily ed. July 16, 1979) (House debate);
125 CoNG. REc. 18,434 (1979) (same).
47
Pub. L. No. 96-74, § 615, 93 Stat. 559, 577 (1979).
48 Pub. L. No. 96-74, § 103, 93 Stat. 559, 562 (1979).
49 See 127 CoNG. REc. H5398 (daily ed. July 30, 1981); 126 CoNG. REC. H7218 (daily
ed. Aug. 19, 1980); 125 CONG. REC. H5983 (daily ed. July 16, 1979).
50
Reported from the House Appropriations Committee on July 9, 1981, H.R. REP.
No. 171, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.; passed by the House on July 30, 1981, 127 CoNG. REC.
H5392-98; reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee on Sept. 22, 1981, S. REP.
No. 192, 97th Cong., lst Sess.; and Senate consideration begun, but not completed, on
Dec. 14, 1981, 127 CONG. REC. S15,177-95 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1981).
51 45 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 111566 (D. Colo. 1980); see also 127 CoNG. REc. H5394-95
(daily ed. July 30, 1981) (remarks of Rep. Dornan); 127 CoNo. REc. H5392-93 (daily
ed. July 30, 1981) (remarks of Rep. Ashbrook).
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racially discriminatory if it had been determined to be discriminatory in a judicial or administrative proceeding, or was established at a time when public schools in its area were desegregating and could not demonstrate that it did not discriminate. 52
This standard is similar to the 1978 IRS proposal whose implementation was stayed by the appropriations riders.

II.

THE TAX-EXEMPTION PROVISION AS A POLICY MEASURE

A. The Nondiscrimination Requirement:
Congressional Recognition
Congress has refused to incorporate an explicit nondiscrimination requirement into the Internal Revenue Code because it
believes existing congressional enactments and legislative debates have clearly established that Congress recognizes nondiscrimination requirements. Civil rights advocates argue that positive legislation would legitimize President Reagan's position
that there is presently no nondiscrimination requirement in the
Code. 53 Congress' belief in the current existence of the nondiscrimination requirement also is apparent in legislative discussion
of a concurrent resolution before Congress stating that "current
Federal law clearly authorizes and requires the Internal Revenue Service to deny tax-exempt status and deductibility of contributions to private schools that discriminate on the basis of
race." 54 A resolution, rather than specific legislation, was introduced because it was felt that "new legislation is both unnecessary and confusing. The law and policy against granting tax
exemptions to such schools is clear."55 Thus, as Senator Moynihan (D-N.Y.) commented, "The administrative decision to
reverse the established federal rule denying tax-exempt status

52

Green v. Miller, 45 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H)~ 1566 (D. Colo. 1980).
See Administration's Change in Federal Policy Regarding tlze Tax-Status of Racially Discriminatory Private Schools: Hearings Before tlze House Comm. on Ways and
Mea11S, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (statement of Lawrence H. Tribe, professor of law,
Harvard Law School).
s.s S. Con. Res. 59, 128 CoNG. REc. SI08 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1982) (remarks of Sen.
Hart) (emphasis added); see infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
55 128 CONG. REc. Sill (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Bradley).
53
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to private schools and colleges that practice racial discrimination
is . . . illegal. " 56
The clear federal policy against discriminatory institutions is
firmly established in Supreme Court decisions such as Brown v.
Board of Education, 57 Norwood v. Harrison, 58 and Runyon v.
McCrmy, 59 as well as in many congressional enactments, including the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Fair Housing Act of
1968, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 6° Congress' reaction to
M cGlotten v. Connally61 illustrates its opposition to granting tax
exemptions to racially discriminatory institutions. In McGlotten, the court held that nonprofit private clubs that excluded
nonwhites from membership were entitled to tax-exempt status.62 The court decided that because the tax exemptions were
income-defining, they should not be conditioned on socially
acceptable behavior.
Congress had determined that in a situation where individuals have banded together to provide recreational facilities
on a mutual basis, it would be conceptually erroneous to
impose a tax on the organization as a separate entity ....
[N]o income of the sort usually taxed has been generated;
the money has simply been shifted from one pocket to another, from within the same pair of pants. 63

Congress expressed its dissatisfaction with McGlotten by
amending the tax-exemption provision of the Internal Revenue
Code to prohibit the granting of tax exemptions to racially discriminatory private clubs. 64 Congress thus views the tax-exemption provision as a matter of broad social policy extending be56 Office of Sen. Moynihan (D-N.Y.), News Release (Jan. 9, 1982) (copy on file with
the author).
57
347 u.s. 483 (1954).
58 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (state aid to discriminatory private schools prohibited).
59
427 U.S. 160 (1976) (private schools must admit minority students under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1976)).
60
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1976); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000-2000h4 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3601 (1976).
61
338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972).
62
Id. at 457-59. The court also held that tax exemptions given to racially discrimi·
natory fraternal organizations were impermissible under Fifth Amendment Equal Pro·
tection analysis. Further, provision of a tax deduction for charitable contributions was
held to be a grant of federal financial assistance within the scope of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. See infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
6) 338 F. Supp. at 458.
64 26 U.S.C. § 50l(c) (1976).
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yond the definition of income. Congress also has indicated that
it supports nondiscrimination as a social policy. 65 Finally,
amending the Code suggests Congress' willingness to act when
it does not approve of the decisions of the other branches of
government. In H aig v. Agee,66 the Supreme Court indicated
that Congress' failure to change an agency ruling is an implicit
acceptance of the ruling. By not enacting legislation in response
to Revenue Ruling 71-447, Congress implied acceptance of its
principle of nondiscrimination. The Ashbrook and Dornan
Amendments also implicitly support the legitimacy of an existing
nondiscrimination requirement by limiting the scope of IRS enforcement efforts. 67
B. The Nondiscrimination Requirement: Enforcement Issues
1. Is a tax exemption government aid? Whether a tax exemption can be classified as government aid raises issues under both
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which forbids granting federal aid
to institutions that discriminate on the basis of "race, color or
national origin,"68 and the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment, which forbids government establishment of religion and severely limits federal aid to religiously affiliated private schools. 69
The district court in McGlotten v. Connally concluded that a
tax exemption to a racially discriminatory fraternal order is
federal aid under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 70 This holding
was based in part on the recognition that other forms of indirect
assistance have been recognized as federal aid. 71 More important, the court found that the purpose of the Act "is clearly to
6.< The Senate Committee Report on this legislation states that "it is believed that it
is inappropriate for a social club ... to be exempt from income taxation if its written
policy is to discriminate on account of race, color, or religion." S. REP. No. 1318, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6051, 6058.
66
101 S. Ct. 2766 0981).
67 Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act, Pub. L.
No. 96-74, §§ 103, 615; see supra notes 49-55; see also Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820,
832-35 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (discussion of Act).
63 42 U .S.C. §§ 2000, 2000d-1 (1976).
69 U.S. Const. amend. I ("Congress shall make no Jaw respecting an establishment of
religion.•. .").See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW§§ 14-8, 149 (1979).
7o 338 F. Supp. 448, 461 (D.D.C. 1972).
11Jd.
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eliminate discrimination in programs or activities benefiting from
federal assistance.""72 The decision is sound, although it raises a
problematic issue concerning the possible "overconstitutionalization" of the Internal Revenue Code, whereby the Code's revenue collecting function is subsumed by social policies derived
from the Constitution.73 As an economic matter, a tax exemption
would have to be entirely income-defining to avoid being characterized as a partial subsidy.74 One report noted:
[A] tax exemption, no fnatter what its form is essentially a
government grant or subsidy. Such grants would seem to be
justified only if the purpose for which they are made is one
for which the legislative body would be equally willing to
make a direct appropriation from public funds. 75

The total prohibition of governmental assistance to discriminatory institutions mandates that the Act's coverage should extend
to the granting of tax exemptions to private schools. 76
The Establishment Clause demands a different analysis of tax
exemptions. In Walz v. Tax Commission, 17 the Supreme Court
held that a tax exemption is not government aid under the
Establishment Clause. The majority opinion explained that
"(t]he grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the
government does not transfer part of its revenue to churches
but simply abstains from demanding that the church support the
state."78 The majority's recognition that a religious institution
benefits through a tax exemption makes this claim appear facially dubious. 79 Establishment Clause analysis, however, focuses on whether the "primary effect" of the exemption is to
aid the institution, not whether some benefit might accrue to
the institution. 80 Thus, a tax exemption might be impermissible
72

/d.

"See Bittker & Kaufman, Taxes and Civil Rights: Constitlltionalizing the Internal
Revenue Code, 82 YALE L.J. 51 (1972).
74 See Yale, Income Tax Deductions and Credits for Nonpublic Education: Toll'ard
a Fair Definition of Net Income, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 91 (1979).
75 BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, REPORT ON A SURVEY OF ADMINISTRATION IN IOWA:
THE REVENUE SYSTEM 33 (1933).
76

Tank Truck Rentals v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958).

n 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
78
79

/d. at 675.
Id. at 674-75.

80 Before 1977, Supreme Court precedents had suggested that almost no form of aid
from the state either to nonpublic schools or to the families of nonpublic school students
would be constitutional. This restriction has been relaxed in recent years. Compare
Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 780-81 (1973) (tuition grants and
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under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 but not under the Establishment Clause. Thus, there may be a conflict between the judicial
branch's prohibition of tax exemptions on constitutional
grounds and the executive branch's interpretation of legislative
enactments.
2. What constitutes discrimination? Determining what constitutes discrimination is analytically complex and emotionally
charged. Should discriminatory acts be limited to explicit racial
practices, such as refusing to admit any minority applicants or
banning interracial dating, or should it include the gender-based
classification found in an all-male military academy? How
should explicit discriminatory beliefs be classified? For instance,
is a Nazi-run school's teaching that blacks are an inferior race
discriminatory? What if such practices are grounded in religious
doctrine, such as Biblical passages that are interpreted to suggest that members of each race should associate only with members of the same race? Finally, what view should be taken of a
school that is racially imbalanced due to factors unrelated to
racial practices or beliefs? For instance, how should a private
school whose classes are taught in German, Chinese, Hebrew,
or Swahili be treated? Additional factors, such as location, idiosyncratic curricula and procedures, and admissions criteria
based on religion, national origin, or measures of achievement
may lead to racially imbalanced schools.
Unless the statutory criteria for nondiscrimination are clear,
a private school will have to make difficult choices concerning
its tax-exempt status. 81 For example, must a school for Orthodox Jews offer scholarships for nonwhite Orthodox Jews? For
white non-Jews? Must it merely promote the fact that minority
Orthodox Jews are welcome to seek admission, or must the
school admit any minority student even though this may hinder
the school's ability to provide a particular type of religious
environment for the education of its students? If such a school
need not abide by these requirements, however, what is to be

deductions and maintenence reimbursements declared unconstitutional), and Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 369-72 (1975) (broad range of direct and indirect aid declared
unconstitutional), with Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1977) (funding upheld
for theraputic and diagnostic tests but prohibited for field trips and instructional materials), and Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 658-61 (1980) (direct
reimbursement to private schools for state mandated testing upheld).
81 See Hearings, supra note 34, at 288-89 (testimony of William B. Ball).
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done with a religious school whose practices are governed by
the Ku Klux Klan? A solution to the tax-exemption dilemma
that does not recognize the onerous practical effect it may have
outside the scope of the original problem only will exacerbate
matters.
A finding of discrimination by a court, as a constitutional
matter, requires a showing of discriminatory intent. The Supreme Court stated in Washington v. Davis82 that its "cases
have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official
act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional, solely because it has a racially
disproportionate impact. "83 Discriminatory intent does not mean
that discrimination was merely a motive, but that it was the
predominant motive. 84 In the case of private schools receiving
state assistance, the test of constitutionality is the Norwood
standard. 85 Under existing IRS procedures, a school that is
found to be discriminatory and thus is prohibited from receiving
state aid under the Norwood standard would be entitled to a tax
exemption if it met the three guidelines outlined in Revenue
Procedure 75-50. 86 The classification of a tax exemption as government aid for purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, however, would result in the incorporation into the Internal Revenue
Code of standards similar to the Norwood constitutional
standards.
Congress can enact a statutory nondiscrimination standard
that is more stringent than existing constitutional standards, 87
as demonstrated by recent congressional action in strengthening
the Voting Rights Act of 1965.88 There, Congress was concerned
426 u.s. 229 (1976).
Id. at 239.
84
See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270
n.21 (1977).
as Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U .S. 455,467 (1973), on remand, 382 F. Supp. 921, 925
(N.D. Miss. 1974) ("[T]he critical time of a private school's formation or unusual
enlargement must be a significant factor .. . in determining whether it is racially discriminatory.").
26 See Hearings, supra note 34, at 1-S (testimony of Jerome Kurtz, Comm'r, IRS);
see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
81
See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648 (1966) (Congress may prohibit usc
of certain literacy tests for voter eligibility, even if use of tests does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
88 See Blumstein, Minority Civil Rights and Voting Rights, Wall St. J., May 27, 1982,
at 28, col. 3.
82

83

1983]

Racially Discriminat01y Private Schools

167

with the difficulty and the enormous expense of proving subjective discriminatory intent. 89 Similar problems exist in determining whether a private school has discriminated. Countervailing
education and tax policies, however, must be considered in this
determination.
C. The Nondiscrimination Requirement: Policy Issues
1. Aid to Private Schools. There are a variety of policy arguments that justify government assistance to private education.
In expressing support for certain forms of state aid to religiously
affiliated schools, Justice Powell asserted that:
Parochial schools, quite apart from their sectarian purpose,
have provided an educational alternative for millions of
young Americans; they often afford wholesome competition
with our public schools; and in some states, they relieve the
tax-burden incident to the operation of public schools. The
state has, moreover, a legitimate interest in facilitating education of the highest quality for all children within its
boundaries, whatever school their parents have chosen for

them. 90
Private schools also may be a desirable educational alternative
because they are free of many of the governmental constraints
on public schools. Private schools can impart values, teach
religion, enforce different disciplinary standards, select and dismiss teachers, and insist on sustained academic achievement in
ways that public schools cannot. This is the essence of their
privateness and of their appeal.
Tax exemptions are critical to the financial survival of private
schools. Twenty-three percent of the revenues of private
schools result from their tax-exempt status or the related charitable deduction. 91 Tax-exempt status is also an essential symbol
of their continued independence from government control.92 Pri69 128 CoNG. REc. S6560-61 (daily ed. June 9, 1982) (statement of Sen. Kennedy);
cf. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 303, 327-28 (1965) (concern over obstruc-

tionist lawsuits at time of original passage of Voting Rights Act led Congress to prescribe
remedies without prior adjudication of voting discrimination).
90 Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 262 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
91 See Hearings, supra note 34, at 400 (testimony of John Esty, Jr., President, Nat'l
Ass'n of Indep. Schools).
92 See Finn, Public Support for Private Education, Pt. 1, AM. Enuc., May 1982, at
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vate schools strongly oppose any quota-based nondiscrimination
standard that would condition a school's tax-exempt status on
its minority enrollment, because such a standard infringes on
their freedom to control their educational curricula. 93
Civil rights groups view the issue differently. For them,
"[w]hat is at stake is not some finely crafted provision of the
tax code but the principles of Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka, Kansas." 94 The civil rights groups' position is that the
government's primary duty is to ensure that tax exemptions are
not given to schools with discriminatory practices. They argue
that the IRS should evaluate a private school's nondiscrimination policy by looking at the actual number of minority students
enrolled in it. 95 Some civil rights proponents also advocate nondiscrimination standards similar to the IRS's August 1978
proposal. 96
The civil rights groups insist that IRS standards that strictly
enforce the nondiscrimination requirements97 are justified by (1)
the rise of all-white "segregation academies" in Southern school
4. It should be noted, however, that a schism exists within private education. On the
one hand, older mainstream schools are willing to accept government regulation as a
cost of obtaining needed government aid. These schools view themselves as quasipublic institutions, linked in many ways with government. See Finn & Devins, Reagan,
Discrimination and Private Schools, Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 1982, at 30, col. 3. On the
other hand, fundamentalist schools, which represent the fastest growing sector of private
education, are unwilling to have themselves linked with government. Leaders of these
groups argue that government should not interfere with their religious liberty by regulating their schools. See Hearings, supra note 34, at 554-56 (testimony of Paul Kiene!,
Executive Director, Ass'n of Christian Schools Jnt'l). The fundamentalists view their
schools as islands of religious freedom. For them, a tax exemption is not government
aid. Rather, it is merely the absence of government involvement in properly private
matters. See Finn, supra, at 7.
93
See Hearings, supra note 34, at 1158-67 (testimony of Robert L. Lamborn, Executive Director, Council for Am. Private Educ.).
94
See Hearings, supra note 34, at 1229 (statement of Charles A. Lane, Co-Chairman,
Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law).
95 See Hearings, supra·note 34, at 470 (statement of Bill Lann Lee, Assistant Counsel,
NAACP Legal Defense Fund). He stated:
The experience in Mississippi indicates that subjective and unverified professions of good faith and nondiscrimination are not enough in the situation where,
as here, an all white private school has been established or significantly expanded in the wake of a local public school desegregation order as an escape
for those seeking to escape the desegregation order.
I d.
96
See infra note 35; see also Hearings, supra note 34, at 1229-32 (statement of Charles
A. Lane); id. at 472-84 (testimony of E. Richard Larson, Nat'] Staff Counsel, Am. Civil
Liberties Union).
97
See also Hearings, supra note 34, at 730 (testimony of ArthurS. Flemming, Chairman, U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights).
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districts that have been subject to desegregation orders, (2) the
increase in the number of direct government aid programs that
could benefit these schools, and (3) the national policy of preventing discriminatory actions. According to these groups, tax
exemptions are not entitlements, which can be taken away only
if schools are blatantly discriminatory, but rather, are benefits
that should be given only to those private schools that demonstrate compliance with the government's goal of nondiscrimination.
Adopting the approach of the civil rights groups would limit
the diversity in thought and methodology that is essential to
private education. This approach also would encourage increased use of the tax system as a tool of social regulation in
the absence of specific congressional mandate. Weak enforcement standards, however, would lead to the equally undesirable
outcome of tacitly approving racially discriminatory practices.
2. Tax Policy Issues. Whether a tax exemption is analogous
to a social welfare program has been perennially debated by tax
policy experts. Boris Bittker and George Radhert have argued
that a tax exemption is different from other forms of government
largesse. They contend that:
Congress has rested income tax exemption on a number of
distinct rationales [including] a lack of fit between the concept of "income" and the objectives of nonprofit organizations; their meager potential as a source of revenue; the
nuisance of record keeping for groups that often operate
informally and rely heavily on voluntary services; and the
praiseworthy benevolent spirit animating such groups. 98

The response to this argument is that Cong(ess' amendment of
the tax exemption provision after McGlotten v. Connally
strongly suggests that Congress regards the social welfare function of groups receiving tax exemptions to be very important.99
Thus, organizations seeking tax exemptions should be required
to remain within broad social parameters established by the
nation's public policies.
The value of tax-exempt organizations, however, stems not
only from their actions, but also from the important national
Bittker & Rahdert, The Exemption ofNonprofit Organizations from Federal Income
Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 304 (1976).
99
See supra notes 67-71.
98
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value of pluralism. 100 Support for diversity of thought has been
strong throughout American history. This suggests that the government should not promote one type of behavior or ideology
over another through largesse. IOI
An additional argument against using tax exemptions as a tool
of social policy is that the primary function of the tax system is
the generation of revenues, not the regulation of social behavior.
Although tax exemptions do encourage some activities and discourage others, 102 modifying the tax-exemption provision of the
Internal Revenue Code to require affirmative action on the part
of private schools would improperly transform that provision
into a mandate for a particular form of socially desirable behavior. Thus, pluralism and revenue generation are considerations
that limit the use of tax-exemption regulations to mere identification of discriminatory practices, not enforcement of affirmative action programs.
III. A POLICY PROPOSAL

..

The nondiscrimination requirement that now governs the
granting of tax exemptions to discriminatory schools should be
based on the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The IRS, unless required
to do otherwise by Congress or the courts, should develop
procedures with the sole purpose of ensuring that tax-exempt
schools operate in a nondiscriminatory manner. Norwood's constitutional standards should guide the IRS in developing these
enforcement procedures.
Congress, however, also should avoid enacting an overly
broad, "effects-only" definition of discrimination. Such an enactment would undercut pluralism interests in favor of affirmative nondiscrimination requirements. Schools that have not discriminated should be entitled to receive tax exemptions. A
private school, however, should be required to submit detailed
information about its operations in order to give the factSee Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 689 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
See Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establishmellt Clause,
67 CALIF. L. REV. I 104 (1979).
102
Critics of the current tax structure argue that government benefits should take the
form of direct government aid. See Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing
Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 705 (1970).
100
101
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finder sufficient information to determine whether the school
discriminates.
It would be difficult, if not impossible, for Congress actively
to oversee IRS implementation of such a policy. Lawmakers
have different views of discriminatory school practices and of
appropriate IRS enforcement procedures. Personal value conflicts might prevent Congress from distinguishing among discriminatory practices, beliefs, and effects.
Congress can adopt, however, a general nondiscrimination
requirement that incorporates past court decisions and recognizes the applicability of constitutional standards. The courts
then will be able to answer the difficult questions regarding the
scope of the nondiscrimination requirement on a case-by-case
basis through private party challenges to determinations of tax
exemption status. The judicial decisions will give the IRS explicit direction for enforcement of the nondiscrimination requirement. If Congress is dissatisfied with the court's statutory interpretations, it can-as it did in the case of racially
discriminatory private clubs-enact correcting legislation.
The current conflict among the three branches of government
regarding the presence of a general nondiscrimination requirement should be eliminated. A more beneficial approach would
be the development of an implicit working relationship among
the branches through the adoption of a general nondiscrimination requirement enacted by Congress, defined by the courts,
and implemented by the IRS.
IV. PoTENTIAL BARRIERS TO SuccESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION
OF A GENERAL NONDISCRIMINATION REQUIREMENT
A. Judicial Barriers: Standing to Sue
The ability of private parties to challenge the sufficiency of
IRS enforcement procedures is the subject of Wright v. Regan.103 The narrow issue before the Supreme Court in Wright is
whether a general "denigration of the race" claim is a sufficient
basis for standing to sue. If such a claim does not suffice, a
103 656 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981), petition for cert.filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3467 (U.S. Dec.
8, 1981) (No. 81-970).

172

Harvard Journal on Legislation

[Vol. 20:153

private party might have to show either that he has been treated
in a discriminatory manner by the school or that the school's
discriminatory practices have impeded area-wide desegregation
efforts. 104 These standards are unsatisfactory to those who seek
strict enforcement of the IRS nondiscrimination requirement. 105
First, if the claim is based on injury to a particular student, the
remedy will be limited to the school's treatment of that student
alone. 106 Second, proving harm from area-wide desegregation in
a given community might be very difficult. 1D7
In one of its most recent standing pronouncements, Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans/or Separation of Church
& State, 108 the Supreme Court held that an allegation of psychological harm is an insufficient basis on which to bring a
claim. 109 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated:
[There is no place in our constitutional scheme for] the
philosophy that the business of the federal courts is correcting constitutional errors and that "cases and controversies"
are at best merely convenient vehicles for doing so and at
worst nuisances that may be dispensed with when they become obstacles to the transcendent endeavor. 110

Similarly, the government alleges in Wright that the fact that a
private party "may share certain attributes common to persons
who may have suffered discrimination at the hands of private
schools, is an insufficent ground upon which to conclude that
they have been injured in fact. " 111 The counterargument is that
the government has an absolute duty to avoid aiding racially
discriminatory institutions and thus plaintiffs' alleged injury is
of a suffieiently personal nature to justify a hearing on the
merits. 112
Congress should anticipate that standing may be denied to
IM See Wright v. Miller, 480 F. Supp. 790 (D.D.C. 1979), aff'd sub nom. Wright v.
Regan, 656 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981), petition for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3467 (U.S.
Dec. 8, 1981) (No. 81-970).
105
See Wright, 656 F.2d at 825 (summary of plaintiffs' complaint in Green v. Connally,
330 F. Supp. 1150, aff'd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971)).
106 /d. at 827.
107
See Devins, Tax Exempt School Issue Alive, Nat'! L.J., Mar. 29, 1982, at 15.
1os 102 S. Ct. 752 (1982).
109 /d.
110 /d. at 767.
111 Petition for Certiorari at 15, Wright, 50 U.S.L.W. 3467 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1981) (No.
81-970).
112 Memorandum Opposing Certiorari filed by Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights
Under Law at 9, Wright, 50 U.S.L.W. 3467 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1981) (No. 81-970).
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individuals seeking relief from generalized discriminatory practices and respond to this possibility by incorporating a "right to
sue" provision as a part of the amended tax-exemption statute.
Admittedly, a provision that confers standing does not obviate
the requirement that "plaintiff still must allege a distinct and
palpable injury to himself, even if it is an injury shared by a
large class of other possible litigants." 113 Such a provision, however, might affect the courts' perception of what constitutes "a
distinct and palpable injury." In his concurrence in Trafficante
v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 114 Justice White wrote:
[A]bsent the Civil Rights Act of 1968, I would have great
difficulty in concluding that petitioner's complaint in this
case presented a case or controversy within the jurisdiction
of the District Court under Article III of the Constitution.
But with that statute purporting to give all those who are
authorized to complain to the agency the right to sue in
Court, I would sustain the Statute insofar as it extends standing to those in the position of the petitioners in this case. 115
If Congress specifically puts a broad standing provision in the
statute, courts will have difficulty circumventing their responsibilities through procedural manipulation and will be more
likely to decide cases on their merits.

B. Legislative Barriers: Appropriation Restrictions
Congress may restrict nondiscrimination enforcement efforts
through the passage of appropriations riders that limit the scope
of the enforcement standards. The Ashbrook and Dornan
Amendments, for example, were designed to prevent implementation of an "affirmative action" nondiscrimination enforcement
standard. 116 Moreover, in the House's revised form, the Ashbrook Amendment seeks to prohibit the IRS from implementing
any standards developed by the courts that grant broader relief
than that provided under existing regulations. 117 This provision
could result in conflicts among the three branches of government
113

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
409 u.s. 205 (1972).
ll$[d. at 212 (White, J., concurring) (citations omitted); see also Simon v. Eastern
Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 n.22 (1976); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410
U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973).
116 See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
117 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
114
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since the constitutional standards of Equal Protection defined
in Norwood118 are more expansive than the existing IRS regulations. Thus, the constitutional decisions of the courts may
conflict directly with the congressional appropriations riders.
The ultimate resolution of these congressional actions might
lead to the very unsatisfactory result of withdrawal of tax exemptions from all private schools. If the IRS obeyed a court
qrder that went beyond existing regulations, it would violate the
House's revised Ashbrook Amendment prohibitions. If the IRS
refused to obey the court order, it could be held in contempt of
court and enjoined from granting any tax exemptions. Congress
then might be forced to try to enact specific legislation in order
to nullify the effect of the court's statutory interpretation. If its
past actions provide any indication, Congress may be incapable
of satisfactorily enacting such specific legislation. 119 Rather,
Congress must establish broad parameters which permit the
courts to define and the IRS to implement the nondiscrimination
requirements.
Such general legislation should incorporate the Norwood constitutional standards into existing enforcement procedures. Congress also should appropriate sufficient funds to the IRS to
implement this standard. Without these funds, the enactment of
a nondiscrimination requirement would do little more than trigger conflicts among the three branches of government, because
the IRS would be financially unable to follow judicial interpretations requiring more stringent enforcement procedures.

C. Executive Barriers: Narrow Statut01y Interpretation
The Executive Branch also can limit the reach of nondiscrimination enforcement standards. Although constitutionally
118 413 U.S. 455 (1973). These problems were hinted at in a pleading filed by the
Justice Department in the Wright litigation:
[The contentions may raise] serious constitutional questions, such as whether
it is constitutionally proper for the Federal Government to confer tax exempt
status on private schools that discriminate on the basis of race. Furthermore,
insofar as the prohibitions may bar defendants from exercising enforcement
discretion or from enforcing fully Code Section 50l(c)(3)'s nondiscrimination
requirement, they may intrude upon the president's duty under Article II of
the United States Constitution to see that the Jaws are faithfully carried out.
Response of Defendants to Second Supplemental Memorandum of Intervenor Wayne
Allen in Support of Motion to Dismiss and Supplemental Memorandum in Support of
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 8-9, Wright, 480 F. Supp. 790 (D.D.C. 1979).
119
But see McGiotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972).
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mandated to faithfully execute the law, 120 the Executive has
considerable latitude in interpreting congressional enactments.
For example, the Carter and the Reagan administrations adopted
conflicting statutory interpretations of the tax-exemption provision. President Reagan based his decision to grant tax exemptions to racially discriminatory private schools on the fact that
Congress had not explicitly required otherwise. 121 The Executive Branch also could narrow judicial decisions interpreting taxexemption statutes by implementing court decrees only in those
areas covered by the court order. 122 To avoid such problems,
Congress should incorporate a requirement into its legislation
that the IRS must implement the nondiscrimination standard in
accordance with specified judicial decisions such as Norwood.
V.

CONCLUSION: ELEMENTS OF PROPER CONGRESSIONAL
ENACTMENT

Congress should incorporate the following provisions into
positive legislation:
(1) a general nondiscrimination requirement that incorporates
existing IRS rulings and procedures along with the constitutional standards that have been determined by the courts;
(2) a right to sue that encourages court rulemaking through
private-party actions; and
(3) provision of sufficient funds to the IRS to implement this
policy.
Congress also must provide statutory guidance. Otherwise,
the current confusion concerning both the existence and the
expansiveness of the nondiscrimination requirement will remain. This is due to a fundamental disagreement within the
Congress and among different Presidents over what constitutes
discrimination and whether a tax exemption is government aid.
Only the judiciar-y can provide consistent guidance on this matter. The judiciary, through case-by-case adjudication, can be
cognizant of differences among private schools subject to review. The proposed statute would provide needed stability to
this highly emotional, erratic area of the law through the formal
1zo U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 1.
1Z1 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
I:U See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
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incorporation of past revenue rulings and procedures. The following legislative proposal incorporates these procedures.
APPENDIX
A BILL

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to prohibit the
granting of tax-exempt status to organizations maintaining
schools with racially discriminatory policies.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. Denial of Tax Exemptions to Organizations Maintaining Schools with Racially Discriminatory Policies.
Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (relating to
exemption from tax) is amended by redesignating subsection G)
as subsection (k) and inserting a new subsection (j) reading as
follows:
G) Organizations Maintaining Schools with Racially Discriminatory Policies
(1) (A) An organization that maintains a regular faculty
and curriculum and has a regularly enrolled body
of students in attendance at the place where its
educational activities are regularly carried on shall
not be deemed to be described in subsection (c)(3),
and shall not be exempt from tax under subsection
(a), if such organization has a racially discriminatory policy.
(B) Any person may commence a civil suit on his own
behalf or on behalf of a class of individuals similarly situated against the Internal Revenue Service
to compel performance of this statute.
(2) For the purposes of this subsection an organization
has a 'racially discriminatory policy' if it
(A) has been adjudicated as racially discriminatory by
a federal or state court or administrative agency;
or
(B) has been either formed or substantially expanded
at or about the time of a local desegregation order
and (i) lacks significant minority enrollment and
(ii) the formation or expansion may be attributed
in whole or in part to the public school desegregation order; or
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(C) fails to comport with any of the following requirements: (i) it must include a statement in its charter

bylaws or other governing instrument, or in a resolution of its governing body, that it has a racially
nondiscriminatory policy as to students and applicants, and (ii) it must include a statement of its
racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students in
all of its brochures and catalogs dealing with student admissions, programs, and scholarships, and
(iii) it must make its racially nondiscriminatory
policy known to all segments of the general community served by the school by announcing its
policy of nondiscrimination through some medium
that reaches the general community served by the
school, and (iv) it must be able to show that all of
its programs and facilities are operated in a racially nondiscriminatory manner.
(3) The Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service
shall have authority to promulgate regulations designed to enforce this provision.

CoMMENTS

The purpose of this Act is to reaffirm the nation's commitment
to nondiscrimination by prohibiting explicitly the granting of tax
exemptions to private schools that discriminate on the basis of
race. Standards are to be established by incorporating existing
IRS rulings and procedures and constitutional nondiscrimination
standards into the Internal Revenue Code.
In the ~ase of religiously affiliated schools, these standards
comport with any final judicial determination holding such standards to be unconstitutional under the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment.
Nondiscrimination enforcement techniques will be enhanced
through enactment of a statutory right to sue, which permits
enforcement of this provision by third parties.
Tax exemptions historically have served as a mechanism for
government encouragement of both specific not-for-profit activities and national pluralism. However, the government's central
and overriding commitment to nondiscrimination prohibits any
government support of institutions that racially discriminate.
The IRS should enforce this requirement through the least re-
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strictive means available to implement this policy in order to
maximize diversity of ideas.
The nondiscrimination requirement, although manifest in past
congressional actions, is formally adopted in this Act. This will
prevent the IRS from misinterpreting Congress' established
commitment to racial nondiscrimination in the granting of tax
exemptions.
The present procedure requires formal adoption of a racial
nondiscrimination policy by the school, provision of specified
related information to the IRS, and publication of the school's
racial nondiscrimination policy in an area newspaper. Religious
schools may satisfy their publication responsibilities through a
religiously affiliated magazine. These standards originated with
the IRS, not Congress. The new procedure will formally incorM
porate these requirements into the taxMexemption provision of
the Internal Revenue Code to ensure that they are neither
greatly expanded nor greatly contracted.
Present procedures are insufficient, as a private school adjuM
dicated as racially discriminatory may retain its taxMexempt staM
tus if it qualifies under current IRS rulings. Under the newly
enacted provisions, the constitutional standards that govern the
grants of government aid to private schools will be applicable
to the governmental granting of tax exemptions to private
schools.
Adequate enforcement of the racial nondiscrimination reM
q:uirement demands more than a set of established procedures.
It requires proper execution of these standards. Private parties
dissatisfied with the IRS's decision concerning the taxMexempt
status of a particular institution should be permitted to obtain
relief in the courts. Congressional enactment of a statutory right
to sue will provide such recourse.

